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Abstract
In this paper, we present modeling and analysis of day-ahead spatio-temporal energy markets in which each competitive player or
aggregator aims at making the highest profit by managing a complex mixture of different energy resources, such as conventional
generators, storage batteries, and uncertain renewable resources. First, we develop an energy market model in terms of an adjustable
robust convex program. This market modeling is novel in the sense that the prosumption cost function of each aggregator, which
evaluates the cost or benefit to realize an amount of spatio-temporal energy prosumption, is a multi-variable function resulting from
a “parameterized” max-min program, in which the variable of the prosumption cost function is involved as a continuous parameter
and the variable of dispatchable resources is involved as an adjustable variable for energy balance. This formulation enables to
reasonably evaluate a reward for intertemporal dispatchability enhancement and a penalty for renewable energy uncertainty in a
unified way. In addition, it enables to enforce a market regulation in which every aggregator is responsible for absorbing his/her
renewable energy uncertainty by managing his/her own dispatchable energy resources. Second, in view of social economy as well
as personal economy, we conduct a numerical analysis on the premise of several photovoltaic penetration levels. In this numerical
analysis, using a bulk power system model of the north east area in Japan, we demonstrate that renewable generators do not always
have priority of energy supply higher than conventional generators due to their uncertainty and limited dispatchability, meaning that
the merit order of conventional and renewable generators can reverse. Furthermore, we analyze long-term evolution of competitive
energy markets demonstrating that there can be found a social equilibrium of battery penetration levels, at which maximum personal
profit with respect to battery system enhancement is attained.
Key words: Day-ahead energy markets, Adjustable robust optimization, Spatio-temporal pricing, Distributed energy resources,
Uncertainty of renewable energy resources, Convex analysis.
1 Introduction
1.1 Research Background
The development of a smart grid has been recognized as
one of the key issues in addressing environmental and social
concerns, such as the sustainability of energy resources and
the efficiency of energy management [1, 2]. In future power
systems operation, it is crucial to appropriately manage a
complex mixture of multiple types of energy resources, such
as conventional generators, energy storage systems and de-
vices, controllable and shiftable loads, and uncertain renew-
able resources, towards the realization of economically effi-
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cient supply-demand balance of energy.
The penetration of energy storage systems, such as electric
vehicles and home energy storage systems, is generally sup-
posed to be spatially distributed due to the limitation of
installation capability [3]. Photovoltaic generator installa-
tion is also supposed to be spatially distributed, especially
in Japan [4], for effective use of roof top spaces. Even though
the impact of such individual materials and components on
the grid may be tiny, the aggregation of them has high po-
tential to serve for supply-demand balance. Thus, an aggre-
gator, a manager of accessible energy resources, can be a
strong stakeholder in electricity markets, the modeling and
analysis of which are the main subject of this paper.
1.2 Literature Review
The existing modeling and analysis of electricity markets
are considerably wide-ranging in terms of objectives, set-
tings, and concepts; see [5] for a recent survey. For a better
understanding of our subject and focus, we first consider
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classifying existing works into the following (not necessarily
mutually exclusive) categories.
1.2.1 Day-ahead and Real-time
The main difference between day-ahead and real-time mar-
kets can be explained in terms of “offline scheduling” and
“online operation.” In a day-ahead market, each market
player transacts their future operation schedule of energy
resources, which mainly prescribes the amounts of energy
production and consumption in consideration of ancillary
service for stable supply [6–10]. On the other hand, each
market player in a real-time market is supposed to transact
their capability of energy resources to compensate discrep-
ancies between operation schedules and real-time operation
results [11–13]. Such discrepancies are possibly caused by
several factors, e.g., load prediction errors, the difference of
time resolutions in scheduling and real operation, and unex-
pected fluctuation of renewable resources. In general, profit-
maximizing strategies in day-ahead and real-time markets
are mutually correlated because of the limitation of energy
resources, leading to dependency of day-ahead and real-time
prices. Optimization models considering such a market cor-
relation are analyzed in [9, 14].
1.2.2 Spatial and Temporal
The notion of market transaction can be extended to space
and time; see, e.g., [8,9] for models of spatio-temporal pric-
ing. In particular, spatial pricing in electricity markets is
called locational marginal pricing or nodal pricing [15–18],
which can evaluate an impact of spatial constraints in a
power network, such as the voltage capacity and thermal
capacity of transmission lines. Depending on the levels of
transmission line congestion, an independent system oper-
ator (ISO) determines spatially distributed energy prices
based on a marginal social cost for stable power supply.
Energy prices can also have a temporal correlation [6, 7, 9,
10]. This aspect deserves attention especially in recent day-
ahead markets. This is because offline scheduling is signifi-
cant in considering intertemporal optimization of the mix-
ture of different types of energy resources. As mentioned
in [1], an electricity market that can explicitly involve such
intertemporal optimization is indispensable for making use
of the power shiftability of batteries or flexible loads, which
will work as key energy resources for future smart grid op-
eration.
1.2.3 Open-loop and Closed-loop
The behavior of market players can be modeled as an opti-
mization problem in which a personal profit maximization is
performed in consideration of market prices. This modeling
can be “open-loop,” meaning that a market price, or its pre-
diction, is assumed to be given independently of the decision
of a market player under consideration, i.e., a price-taker
setting [6,7,10,14,19]. Such an open-loop model is valid, as
long as the situations of most other players, e.g., the consti-
tution of energy resources and the strategy in profit maxi-
mization, is stationary. However, in general, market prices
are determined as assembly of the decisions of all market
players. Such a market model is “closed-loop,” meaning that
the player decision is mutually correlated with the resultant
price [8, 9, 18, 20–22]. This type of closed-loop modeling is
crucial to discuss long-term evolution of competitive mar-
kets in which energy resource constitution is non-stationary.
An important difference between open-loop and closed-loop
modeling is that the former is relevant to economic schedul-
ing or strategic bidding from the standpoint of a “single
player” while the latter is relevant to system design or mech-
anism design from the standpoint of a “system authority.”
1.2.4 Convex and Non-convex
Microeconomics is grounded in convex analysis [23, 24]. As
thoroughly discussed in [17], an optimal energy price can
be calculated as a marginal social cost of economic dispatch
problems, which are often formulated as convex programs.
This pricing method builds on the convexity of social costs,
implying that a non-convex cost, such as the start-up cost
of generators, cannot be reflected in the resultant marginal
price; see, e.g., [6, 8, 13, 25] for models with such a unit
commitment (UC) problem. A theoretically grounded ap-
proach to dealing with such non-convexity is approximate
convexification of social costs, called convex hull pricing.
This method is shown to minimize the amount of particular
side-payments caused by convexification. However, it gen-
erally yields another complicate issue on revenue adequacy,
i.e., a financial issue on revenue allocation, which is often
affected by a subjective decision of ISO; see [26] for details.
1.2.5 Bottom-up and Top-down
Last, but not least, the difference of market modeling con-
cepts is explained in terms of “bottom-up” and “top-down.”
A bottom-up approach is an engineering approach that is
based on a stacking-up process of detailed elements. Exist-
ing works can mostly be classified into this category, devel-
oping complex integrated market models. Though such a
model can serve for elaborate empirical studies, it is often
cumbersome to find out key drivers and structures due to
a high degree of parametric and structural freedom. A top-
down approach is a systems theoretic approach, or a reverse
engineering approach, that is based on a breaking-down pro-
cess starting from an “appropriate level of abstraction.” Ex-
amples include [17, 26], which are based on supply-demand
models without distributed energy resources. A major ad-
vantage of this approach is to provide a simple but princi-
pled framework to discuss a universal law in electricity mar-
kets. Synthesis of both bottom-up and top-down approaches
would be significant to develop a principled market frame-
work.
1.3 Focus and Contribution of Present Paper
With the categorization in Section 1.2, we model and
analyze an electricity market that is day-ahead, spatio-
temporal, closed-loop, and convex, which we call here a
spatio-temporal energy market. In Section 3, based on a
top-down approach, we first develop a mathematical foun-
dation for modeling and analysis of the spatio-temporal
energy market, where each competitive aggregator aims at
making the highest profit by managing a complex mixture
of different energy resources. The theoretical contributions
in this paper are summarized as follows.
• We formulate a novel prosumption cost function of each
aggregator as a multi-variable function that results from a
parameterized max-min program, given as the collection
of an infinite number of max-min programs.
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• We prove the convexity of such a prosumption cost func-
tion, in which the amount of spatio-temporal energy pro-
sumption is involved as a non-adjustable variable while
the variable of dispatchable resources is involved as an
adjustable variable for energy balance.
It will be found that the resultant market clearing prob-
lem, which is formulated as a social cost minimization prob-
lem composed of a family of the parameterized max-min
programs, is given as an “adjustable” robust convex pro-
gram [27], which is also referred to as a two-stage robust
convex program [28,29]. To the best of the authors’ knowl-
edge, such an idea of describing a “closed-loop” energy mar-
ket model based on an adjustable robust convex program
has not been reported in the literature, though scheduling
problems or open-loop (price taker-based) market models
with uncertain resources, such as robust UC problems, have
been discussed in terms of two-stage robust or stochastic op-
timization over recent years; see [6,25,30–32] and references
therein. As explained in Section 1.2.3, such scheduling prob-
lems are formulated from the viewpoint of a single player
who can directly handle all energy resources, while our mar-
ket model in this paper is formulated from the viewpoint of
a system authority who considers mechanism design such
that market players, each of whom has his/her own energy
resources, behave as desired. We also remark that the signif-
icance of adjustable robust optimization and difference from
the standard robust optimization are clearly stated in [27].
The proposed market modeling enables to evaluate not only
a reward for enhancement of intertemporal dispatchability
owing to dispatchable energy resources, but also a penalty
for uncertainty due to renewable energy resources. Further-
more, it enables to enforce a “market regulation” in which
each aggregator is responsible for absorbing the uncertainty
of his/her renewable power generation so that his/her dis-
patchable prosumption schedule can be regularly transacted
in the day-ahead energy market. These properties, deriv-
ing from the formulation based on adjustable robust opti-
mization, give a clear distinction from the existing market
models reviewed above. In fact, the market regulation con-
sidered in this paper is compatible with the “planned bal-
ancing policy” that has been recently published in Japan
for power market liberalization, where both consumers and
producers must submit deterministic consumption and gen-
eration schedules to a system operator, called Organization
for Cross-regional Coordination of Transmission Operators
(OCCTO); see, e.g., [33, Section 19] for details. We remark
that our market modeling based on adjustable robust op-
timization can be seen as a mathematical interpretation of
the planned balancing policy in Japan.
In Section 4, on the premise of several photovoltaic penetra-
tion levels, we conduct a numerical analysis to investigate
what level of battery penetration can be realized as a result
of aggregators’ rational decisions, under the market regula-
tion in which each aggregator is responsible for absorbing
the uncertainty of his/her renewable power generation. The
specific contribution there is to give the following insights
from the viewpoint of mechanism design.
• The proposed market model in terms of adjustable ro-
bust optimization can naturally reproduce the empirical
finding [34] that renewable generators do not always have
priority of energy supply higher than conventional gener-
ators due to their uncertainty and limited dispatchability.
• There is a social equilibrium of battery penetration levels,
at which maximum personal profit with respect to battery
system enhancement is attained.
The first insight is relevant to the “merit order” of conven-
tional versus renewable generators. The second is relevant
to long-term evolution of competitive energy markets; see
Section 2.3 for more details of motivation to study. This pa-
per builds on preliminary versions [35, 36]. Compared with
them, this paper newly gives the formulation of uncertain
renewable resources, which enables the analysis of battery
penetration levels. In addition, spatial constraints are also
considered in the proposed model.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Day-Ahead Energy Market as Convex Optimization
In this subsection, to make the following discussion self-
consistent, we overview the relation between a day-ahead
energy market and an optimization problem from a top-level
view of abstraction. For clarity, we first consider a small ex-
ample where three market players, called aggregators, par-
ticipate in a day-ahead market. In particular, the schedule
of the total energy amount in the forenoon and that in the
afternoon are supposed to be transacted, meaning that the
whole day schedule transaction is divided into two energy
markets at the AM and PM spots.
The objective of ISO is to find a suitable set of transaction
energy amounts among the aggregators and a set of clear-
ing prices assigned to the transaction energy amounts. For
example, suppose that a market result is determined as in
Table 1, where positive and negative energy amounts corre-
spond to production and consumption, respectively. In this
example, the transaction energy amounts can be written as
x∗1 =
(
150
100
)
, x∗2 =
(
−250
−50
)
, x∗3 =
(
100
−50
)
and the clearing price can be written as
λ∗ =
(
10
5
)
.
Note that all these vectors, which are the decision variables
of ISO, are two-dimensional vectors, the dimension of which
corresponds to the number of time spots. Furthermore, the
transaction energy amounts are balanced, i.e.,
x∗1 + x
∗
2 + x
∗
3 = 0.
This represents the balance of production and consumption
(prosumption) energy amounts at “every” time spot.
Let A denote the label set of aggregators and let T denote
the label set of time spots on the day of interest. In this
paper, the event of finding a set of balanced prosumption
profiles and a clearing price profile, denoted by (x∗α)α∈A and
λ∗, is referred to as market clearing ; A specific example in
which
A = {1, 2, 3}, T = {AM,PM}
is given above. With this terminology, we review a gen-
eral market clearing problem in terms of intertemporal op-
timization. To this end, we introduce the notion of a profit,
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Table 1
Example of market result. Three aggregators and two time spots.
Agg. 1 (Producer) Agg. 2 (Consumer) Agg. 3 (Prosumer) Clearing Price
Spot 1 (AM) 150 [kWh] -250 [kWh] 100 [kWh] 10 [JPY/kWh]
Spot 2 (PM) 100 [kWh] -50 [kWh] -50 [kWh] 5 [JPY/kWh]
which is a personal objective function of aggregators. Un-
der a clearing price profile λ∗, the resultant profit of the αth
aggregator is written as
Jα(x
∗
α;λ
∗) = 〈λ∗, x∗α〉 − Fα(x∗α) (1)
where the inner product 〈λ∗, x∗α〉 corresponds to the income
obtained from the energy market and Fα denotes the cost
function to realize a prosumption profile. Note that Fα may
be negative, meaning that it may be a benefit function de-
pending on its sign. Similarly, the income may also be nega-
tive, meaning that the inner product term can be regarded
as income or outgo depending on its sign. For instance,
〈λ∗, x∗1〉 = 2000, 〈λ∗, x∗2〉 = −2750, 〈λ∗, x∗3〉 = 750
in the three-aggregator example above.
The social profit, which is a social objective function of ISO,
is given as
|A|∑
α=1
Jα(x
∗
α;λ
∗) =
〈
λ∗,
|A|∑
α=1
x∗α
〉
−
|A|∑
α=1
Fα(x
∗
α). (2)
Note that the social income, represented as the inner prod-
uct term, is zero as long as the balance of prosumption pro-
files is attained. From this observation, we see that the so-
cial profit maximization problem is equivalent to the social
cost minimization problem formulated as
min
(x1,...,x|A|)∈C1×···×C|A|
|A|∑
α=1
Fα(xα) s.t.
|A|∑
α=1
xα = 0. (3)
In this optimization problem, a feasible domain Cα is in-
troduced for each prosumption profile xα. In particular, we
define it as
Cα := {xα : |xα| ≤ Cα}, (4)
which represents the transmission line constraint on xα. For
a better understanding, we give a schematic depiction of the
three-aggregator example in Fig. 1(a) where xα can be seen
as the prosumption profile outflowing from the αth aggre-
gator to the central bus at which supply-demand balance is
attained. This is a single bus system, meaning that no spe-
cific network structure among aggregators is considered.
It is clear that an optimal primal variable (x∗α)α∈A cor-
responds to the transacted prosumption profiles. Further-
more, an optimal dual variable λ∗, i.e., the Lagrange mul-
tiplier associated with the prosumption balance constraint,
corresponds to the clearing price profile [15, 17]. Thus, the
socially optimal market clearing problem is equivalent to
the social cost minimization problem (3), provided that it is
a convex program [23,24]. In addition, the socially optimal
market results can attain the profit maximization of each
aggregator; see Proposition 3 for details.
Agg. 1
Agg. 2
Agg. 3
Agg. 1
Agg. 2
Agg. 3
(a)
(b) Bus 1
Bus 2
Bus 3
Bus
Fig. 1. (a) Single-bus system. (b) Three-bus system.
2.2 Day-Ahead Energy Market with Spatial Constraints
In this subsection, a network structure among aggregators
is introduced. For explanation, we again refer to the three-
aggregator example in Section 2.1. Let us give a network
structure among three aggregators as in Fig. 1(b), where
three intermediate buses are introduced. The prosumption
profile outflowing from the αth aggregator to the ith bus is
denoted by x
(i)
α . In a manner similar to (4), its transmission
line constraint can be written with
C(i)α := {x(i)α : |x(i)α | ≤ C(i)α }.
If there is no direct transmission line between the αth ag-
gregator and the ith bus, we set C
(i)
α = 0, which can enforce
x
(i)
α = 0. For example, we set
C
(3)
1 = 0, C
(2)
2 = 0, C
(1)
3 = 0
as being compatible with Fig. 1(b).
With slight abuse of notation, we redefine the variable of
the αth aggregator as the augmented prosumption profile
xα := (x
(1)
α , . . . , x
(|B|)
α ) (5)
where B denotes the label set of buses. Note that this xα
represents a “spatio-temporal” prosumption profile, which
is (|T |×|B|)-dimensional. Then, we can compactly represent
the set of all transmission line constraints on x
(1)
α , . . . , x
(|B|)
α
by xα ∈ Cα where Cα is also redefined as
Cα := C(1)α × · · · × C(|B|)α . (6)
Based on this augmented representation, the market clear-
ing problem with the spatial constraints can also be written
in the form of (3). It should be remarked that the equality
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constraint of (3) is equivalent to
|A|∑
α=1
x(i)α = 0, ∀i ∈ B.
In accordance with each balancing equation, a clearing price
profile, denoted by λ(i), is assigned at each of all buses. In
other words, the resultant clearing price profile is also a
spatio-temporal variable as
λ := (λ(1), . . . , λ(|B|)), (7)
which is (|T | × |B|)-dimensional.
2.3 Key Questions
In this subsection, we list several key questions to be dis-
cussed in this paper. The first question is:
Q1: How to model the cost function of prosumption profiles
in a reasonable manner?
In the discussion of Section 2.1 above, we implicitly suppose
that the prosumption cost function Fα in (3) is a given
convex function, which must be “multi-variable,” i.e.,
Fα : R|T |×|B| → R.
However, in practice, it is not always easy to identify such
an “spatio-temporally” correlated cost function. In addi-
tion, aggregators are generally “prosumers,” meaning that
the prosumption profile xα should be a complex mixture
of different types of energy resources. A prosumption cost
function should reflect idiosyncratic properties and struc-
tures of each prosumer. An answer to this question will be
given in Section 3.
The second question is:
Q2: Is it reasonable to say in the spatio-temporal energy
market that uncertain renewable resources have priority
higher than dispatchable generators in terms of conven-
tional merit order?
It is often mentioned that renewable generators have priority
higher than conventional generators because the marginal
cost of renewable resources is zero, or close to zero. However,
this conclusion is possibly premature in the spatio-temporal
energy market. This is because the marginal cost function to
realize a prosumption profile xα is not only “multi-variable”
but also “multi-valued,” i.e.,
∂Fα : R|T |×|B| → R|T |×|B| (8)
which is called the subdifferential of Fα shown to be a mono-
tone mapping [23]. This multi-dimensionality comes from
the spatio-temporal correlation of prosumption cost func-
tions. In addition, renewable and conventional generators
should be distinguished in terms of the difference of realiz-
able prosumption profiles, i.e., the difference of intertempo-
ral dispatchability. Thus, it is not trivial to determine the
“merit order” of different energy resources.
Furthermore, the uncertainty of renewable power genera-
tion must be considered in discussing its marginal cost. Note
that, though the day-ahead prediction of renewable power
generation necessarily involves some degree of uncertainty,
the prosumption profile x∗α should be “deterministic” so
that it can be regularly transacted in the day-ahead market.
This implies that each aggregator should be responsible for
absorbing the uncertainty of his/her renewable power gen-
eration. In general, large uncertainty can lead to conserva-
tive management of dispatchable energy resources; thereby
reducing social profit as well as personal profit of each ag-
gregator.
One prospective way to regulating the uncertain fluctua-
tion of renewable power generation would be a smart use
of energy storage systems. In fact, its potential has been
attracting much attention towards effective integration of
dispatchable and renewable power generation. However, the
existing works have not yet been paid much attention on
the question:
Q3: What level of energy storage penetration is econom-
ically reasonable from the viewpoints of not only social
profit but also personal profit?
In general, large penetration of energy storage systems
serves for improving social profit because it has a potential
to reduce the waste of renewable power curtailments and to
regulate load profiles by peak load shifting. However, from
the viewpoint of aggregator’s “personal” profit, it is not
clear what degree of increased profit deserves to make an
investment in the enhancement of energy storage systems.
We will discuss Q2 and Q3 through the numerical analysis
in Section 4.
3 Mathematical Foundation
3.1 Aggregator Model
In this subsection, we provide a model of aggregators as in-
corporating their idiosyncrasy. This is a breaking-down pro-
cess to elaborate on the abstracted market model in (3). For
simplicity of notation, we do not make a distinction among
the aggregators in this model description, i.e., we drop the
subscript α as long as there is no chance of confusion.
The prosumption energy of an aggregator at the tth time
spot can be described as∑|B|
i=1 x
(i)
t = gt−lt+pt−qt+ηoutδoutt − 1ηin δint , t ∈ T (9)
where x
(i)
t ∈ R denotes the prosumption energy outflowing
to the ith bus, gt ∈ R+ denotes the power generation of dis-
patchable generators, lt ∈ R+ denotes the load, pt ∈ R+ and
qt ∈ R+ denote the power generation and power curtailment
of renewable generators, and δint ∈ R+ and δoutt ∈ R+ denote
the battery charge and discharge energy. The constants ηin
and ηout denote the charge and discharge efficiency, respec-
tively, each of which takes a value in (0, 1]. Note that the
sign of x
(i)
t is positive for outflow direction to the ith bus.
For a better understanding of the battery terms, let us con-
sider the case where the aggregator of interest is just com-
posed of a battery system, and is connected to only the ith
bus. In this case, (9) is reduced to
x
(i)
t = η
outδoutt − 1ηin δint , t ∈ T .
Suppose that both ηout and ηin are 0.9. Then, if the aggre-
gator sells x
(i)
t = 9, this energy is supplied by δ
out
t = 10 and
δint = 0. Note that the decrement in battery-stored energy
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is larger than the sold energy due to discharging loss. On
the other hand, if the aggregator sells x
(i)
t = −10, which
implies purchase, this energy is consumed by δoutt = 0 and
δint = 9, meaning that the increment in battery-stored en-
ergy is smaller than the purchased energy due to charging
loss. Note that the increment in the battery-stored energy
at the tth time spot can be written as δint − δoutt .
In the following, we denote the stacked vector of a symbol,
called a profile, by that without the subscript t. For exam-
ple, the load profile l = (lt)t∈T represents the sequence of
load amounts, which is |T |-dimensional. Furthermore, we
denote by x in (5) the collection of the prosumption profiles
outflowing from the aggregator, called the spatio-temporal
prosumption profile. Throughout the paper, the load profile
l is supposed to be a given constant vector, i.e., the pre-
diction of the load profile is supposed to perform without a
prediction error. On the other hand, the renewable power
generation profile p is supposed to be an uncertain variable
that can vary within a scenario set, denoted by P. In par-
ticular,
p ∈ P, P := {p(1), . . . , p(m)}, (10)
where m different scenarios are considered in the day-ahead
prediction. For simplicity of discussion, we here suppose
that P is composed of a finite number of renewable scenar-
ios, though the following discussion can be extended also to
the case of continuous sets of infinite many scenarios. Note
that, if necessary, we can also model the uncertainty of load
profiles in the same way as that of renewable profiles.
The dispatchable power generation profile g, the renewable
power curtailment profile q, and the battery charge and dis-
charge power profiles δin and δout are decision variables that
can be controlled by the aggregator. To realize a desired
prosumption profile x, the aggregator aims at controlling
g, q, and δ := (δin, δout) in compliance with some physi-
cal constraints. In particular, the bounds for dispatchable
power generation and the limitation of inverter and battery
capacities are represented by given domains G and D, i.e.,
g ∈ G, δ ∈ D. (11)
For example, these can represent a constraint g ≤ g ≤ g,
where g and g are given constant vectors representing the
lower and upper bounds for generator outputs. The renew-
able power curtailment profile must not be greater than the
the renewable power generation profile, i.e., 0 ≤ q ≤ p for
each scenario p ∈ P. In this paper, this is written by
q ∈ Q(p), p ∈ P. (12)
Note that the domainQ(p) is dependent on which renewable
power generation profile p arises from the scenario set P.
3.2 Characterization of Realizable Prosumption Profiles
We consider giving a mathematical description of intertem-
poral dispatchability of aggregator’s energy prosumption.
With respect to each spatio-temporal prosumption profile
x under a renewable scenario p ∈ P, we denote the feasi-
ble domain of g, δ, and q, which are called the dispatchable
variables, by
F(x; p) := {(g, δ, q) ∈ G × D ×Q(p) : (9) holds}. (13)
Note that x and p are involved as “parameters” in the con-
straint of the dispatchable variables. More specifically, a fea-
sible domain F(x; p) of the stacked version (g, δ, q) of the
dispatchable variables is determined as a standard set if the
parameters x and p are fixed as constant vectors.
Based on this parameterized domain, we define the following
set of realizable prosumption profiles.
Proposition 1 Suppose that G and D are convex. Then
the set of realizable prosumption profiles defined by
X := {x ∈ R|T |×|B| : F(x; p) 6= ∅, ∀p ∈ P} (14)
is convex.
Proof We see that X can be written as
X =
⋂
p∈P
X ′(p), X ′(p) := {x ∈ R|T |×|B| : F(x; p) 6= ∅}.
We can prove the convexity of X ′(p) as follows. The feasible
domain of
∑|B|
i=1 x
(i), denoted by X ′′(p), is convex because
it is an affine mapping of the convex domain G ×D×Q(p).
As shown in [23, Theorem 3.4], the inverse image of a con-
vex domain under a linear mapping is convex. This implies
that X ′(p) is convex because it is an inverse image of X ′′(p)
under summation. Therefore, X is convex because it is an
intersection of convex domains. 
For explanation, let us consider the meaning of “0 ∈ X .”
This means that the supply-demand balance inside the ag-
gregator, i.e., x = 0, or equivalently,
x(1) = · · · = x(|B|) = 0, (15)
is surely realizable for “any” renewable scenario p arising
from P. This can be seen as follows. Suppose that the
sth renewable scenario p(s) arises. Then, the condition of
F(0; p(s)) 6= ∅ means that there exists at least one combi-
nation of the dispatchable variables such that the supply-
demand balance is attained in the sth renewable scenario,
i.e.,
∃(g, δ, q) ∈ G × D ×Q(p(s)) s.t.
0 = g − l + p(s) − q + ηoutδout − 1ηin δin.
Therefore, F(0; p) 6= ∅ for all p ∈ P means that, for each of
all renewable scenarios, there exists at least one combination
of the dispatchable variables such that the supply-demand
balance inside the aggregator is attained, i.e., (15) holds.
Note that (g, δ, q) is an “adjustable” variable, meaning that
it can vary such that the energy balance in (9) is attained
for each of all scenarios p ∈ P under a spatio-temporal
prosumption profile x ∈ X .
As seen here, X can be understood as the collection of all
possible spatio-temporal prosumption profiles that can be
surely realizable for each of all renewable scenarios. In the
rest of this paper, we suppose that each aggregator trans-
acts only a prosumption profile x involved in X . This corre-
sponds to a “market regulation” in which every aggregator is
responsible for absorbing the uncertainty of his/her renew-
able power generation by managing his/her own dispatch-
able energy resources. Proposition 1 shows that this market
regulation of uncertainty absorption ensures the convexity
of X , crucial for marginal cost pricing.
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Remark 1 The idiosyncrasy of X can be understood as
the individual characteristics of intertemporal dispatcha-
bility that can be produced from energy resource manage-
ment. For a better understanding, let us consider a simple
aggregator that is connected to only one bus and just has
a conventional generator, i.e., x = g. Then, it is easy to see
that X = G. On the other hand, for an aggregator that is
connected to only one bus and just has a renewable energy
resource, i.e., x = p− q, we see that
X = {x ∈ R|T | : 0 ≤ x ≤ pmin}, pmin := minP (16)
where the minimum of P is taken in the element-wise sense.
Note that pmin represents the lower envelope of all possible
renewable scenarios. This means that the uncertainty is re-
moved just by curtailment; The larger the uncertainty is,
the smaller the domain X is. Such a waste of energy curtail-
ment can be reduced, e.g., if the aggregator has a battery.
This battery introduction can actually enlarge the domain
of X . In this sense, the “size” of X can be understood as
a level of intertemporal dispatchability, or flexibility, of the
corresponding aggregator under the market regulation of
uncertainty absorption.
3.3 Deduction of Prosumption Cost Function
We consider assessing a cost of each spatio-temporal pro-
sumption profile x ∈ X . This gives an answer to Q1 in
Section 2.3. To this end, we introduce the cost functions of
dispatchable power generation and battery charge and dis-
charge as
G : G → R, D : D → R, (17)
which represent practically accessible cost functions, such
as the fuel cost of generators and the deterioration cost of
batteries. With this notation, we can deduce a convex pro-
sumption cost function as follows.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the generation cost function
G and the battery cost function D are convex over convex
domains G and D. Then, the prosumption cost function
F (x) := max
p∈P
min
(g,δ,q)∈F(x;p)
{
G(g) +D(δ)
}
(18)
is convex over the convex domain X .
Proof We see that
∑|B|
i=1 x
(i) in (9) is given as an affine
mapping of (g, δ, q), and x is an inverse image of
∑|B|
i=1 x
(i)
under summation. As shown in [23, Theorem 5.7], the image
of a convex function under an affine mapping as well as the
inverse image of a convex function under an affine mapping
are both convex functions. This implies that F ′ defined as
F ′(x; p) := min
(g,δ,q)∈F(x;p)
{
G(g) +D(δ)
}
(19)
is convex with respect to x for each p ∈ P. In addition,
the pointwise supremum of an arbitrary collection of convex
functions is convex, as shown in [23, Theorem 5.5]. Thus,
the convexity of F is proven for any set P, which may be
discrete or continuous. 
The meaning of the prosumption cost function can be ex-
plained as follows. For clarity, we first discuss the value of
F (0), i.e., the cost to realize the spatio-temporal prosump-
tion profile x = 0. Suppose that the sth renewable scenario
p(s) arises. Then, F(0; p(s)), defined as in (13), represents
the set of all possible combinations of g ∈ G, δ ∈ D, and
q ∈ Q(p(s)) such that the supply-demand balance is at-
tained inside the aggregator. Note that there can be infinite
many combinations of the dispatchable variables satisfying
this supply-demand balance. Thus, we can use this remain-
ing degree of freedom to minimize the sum of the generation
and battery costs, as in the minimization part of (18).
Let us denote the minimum value by F ′(0; p(s)), for which
F ′ is defined as in (19). Note that both x and p in (19) are
involved as parameters in the constraint of the minimiza-
tion problem. This means that (g, δ, q) is an “adjustable”
variable. Therefore, the minimizer (g∗, δ∗, q∗) is a function
dependent on p ∈ P and x ∈ X . The value of F ′(0; p(s)) cor-
responds to the minimum cost to attain the supply-demand
balance under the specific renewable scenario p(s). It should
be noted that simultaneous charging and discharging of bat-
teries is to be automatically avoided as a result of battery
cost minimization. This is because such a redundant opera-
tion causes unnecessary energy loss unless both charge and
discharge efficiencies are one.
Finally, the value of F (0) is defined as the worst cost among
all possible renewable scenarios, i.e.,
F (0) = max
s∈{1,...,m}
F ′(0; p(s)).
As seen here, to find the value of F (0), or, more generally,
to find the value of F (x) for a “fixed” parameter x, is a
single max-min program. Note that this max-min program is
different from a standard robust optimization problem [37]
defined as a “min-max” program for minimizing the worst-
case cost. It should be further noted that the worst-case
scenario p(s
∗) ∈ P is a function dependent on x ∈ X . This
means that the worst-case scenario is not unique in general,
but it depends on how much amounts of energy are bought
or sold at the respective time spots.
The continuous function F (x) can be calculated as the col-
lection of all minimum costs to realize respective prosump-
tion profiles, provided that each x is an element of X . Note
that the closed form of F cannot be written down in gen-
eral; It encapsulates complex information of different en-
ergy resources, such as the uncertainty of renewable power
generation and the physical constraints of generators and
batteries.
Remark 2 One may think that the convexity of F is not
surprising because of assuming the convexity of G and D.
For emphasis, we remark that the prosumption cost function
is defined based on a “parameterized” max-min program in
which the variable x is involved as a “continuous parameter”
in the equality constraint (9). In fact, the max-min program
in the right-hand side of (18) can be reduced to a set of
scenario-wise convex programs if the parameter x is fixed.
In other words, F is defined as the collection of an infinite
number of scenario-wise convex programs. The significance
of Proposition 2 is to show, by virtue of convex analysis
theory [23], that such a complicated function is convex with
respect to the multi-valued parameter x. It is interesting
to note that, even though the maximization with respect
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to p may be a non-convex program for a continuous set
P, being possibly non-convex, the resultant function F is
indeed convex with respect to x. To the best of the authors’
knowledge, such an idea of formulating the cost function, or,
at the same time, benefit function, based on a parameterized
max-min program has not been reported in the literature of
spatio-temporal energy market modeling.
Remark 3 In Proposition 2, the worst case of renewable
scenarios is considered. This can be replaced with the ex-
pectation with respect to renewable scenarios as
F˜ (x) :=
m∑
s=1
pi(s) min
(g,δ,q)∈F(x;p(s))
{
G(g) +D(δ)
}
(20)
where pi(s) denotes the realization probability of the renew-
able scenario p(s). This F˜ is also shown to be convex. Note
that the variable x is involved here as a parameter of the ex-
pected cost minimization problem in the right-hand side of
(20). Even though this F˜ is defined in terms of expectation,
every prosumption profile x ∈ X is surely realizable for all
possible renewable scenarios p ∈ P, because X is defined as
the robust feasible domain in (14). This is categorized into
a two-stage stochastic programing framework.
Remark 4 We give a remark on the cost or penalty of re-
newable power curtailment. In Proposition 2, we do not ex-
plicitly evaluate the cost of q. However, this does not mean
that the renewable power curtailment results in no loss of
profit. For clarity, we consider an aggregator that is con-
nected to only one bus and just has a renewable resource,
i.e., x = p− q. Then,
F (x) = 0, ∀x ∈ X
with X given as in (16). This means that every x involved in
X is equally realizable without causing any cost. Consider
the personal profit maximization with J defined as in (1).
Whenever the resultant clearing price profile is positive, i.e.,
λ∗ > 0, the profit-maximizing prosumption profile is found
as x∗ = pmin. This shows that the least renewable power
curtailment is naturally obtained as the rational decision in
accordance with the premise of profit maximization.
3.4 Spatio-Temporal Energy Market Model
Because each prosumption cost function is convex as shown
in Proposition 2, the socially optimal market clearing prob-
lem (3) is found to be an adjustable, or two-stage, robust
convex program. In particular, (3) is a first-stage problem
to find the optimal non-adjustable variable (x∗α)α∈A, while
the family of
Fα(xα) = max
pα∈Pα
min
(gα,δα,qα)∈Fα(xα;pα)
{
Gα(gα) +Dα(δα)
}
for all aggregators is the family of second-stage problems to
find the optimal adjustable variables (g∗α, δ
∗
α, q
∗
α)α∈A such
that the uncertainty of renewable resources is absorbed in-
side individual aggregators on their own responsibility.
Based on the convexity of the market model, we can see a
clear relation between microeconomics and convex analysis.
To see this, using Cα in (6), which denotes the feasible do-
main with respect to the transmission line constraints, we
consider the Lagrangian dual problem
max
λ
|A|∑
α=1
min
xα∈Cα
{
Fα(xα)− 〈λ, xα〉
}
, (21)
which is equivalent to (3) owing to the strong duality. Note
that this λ is found as a spatio-temporal variable in (7), for
which the inner product term is calculated as
〈λ, xα〉 =
|B|∑
i=1
〈λ(i), x(i)α 〉.
As shown in the following proposition, the clearing price
profile, denoted by λ∗, can achieve the maximal personal
profit of every aggregator under the prosumption balance
constraint.
Proposition 3 Consider the Lagrangian dual problem
(21). With the profit function Jα defined as in (1), let
xα(λ) :=
{
xα∈Xα :Jα(xα;λ)≥Jα(x′α;λ), ∀x′α∈Xα
}
(22)
be the set of all spatio-temporal prosumption profiles that
attain the maximum profit under a spatio-temporal price
profile λ. Then, (x∗α)α∈A and λ
∗ are primal and dual solu-
tions to (21) if and only if
x∗α ∈ xα(λ∗), ∀α ∈ A, and
|A|∑
α=1
x∗α = 0. (23)
Proof The convex conjugate of Fα is defined as
Fα(λ) := sup
xα∈Cα
{〈λ, xα〉 − Fα(x)} ,
which is called the Legendre-Fenchel transformation [23].
For the maximization in (21), its first-order optimality con-
dition yields the generalized equation
0 ∈
∑
α∈A
∂Fα(λ
∗). (24)
To prove the equivalence between (23) and (24), it suffices
to show the identity of
xα(λ) = ∂Fα(λ). (25)
Consider some x?α ∈ xα(λ), i.e., a maximizer of Jα under a
given λ. Then, its optimality condition yields λ ∈ ∂Fα(x?α).
Because ∂Fα is shown to be the inverse mapping of ∂Fα;
see [23, Theorem 23.5], it is equivalent to x?α ∈ ∂Fα(λ).
Hence, (25) is proven. 
Remark 5 We again remark the significance of the pro-
posed market model. One may think that an economic dis-
patch problem with uncertain renewable resources can be
formulated as a robust optimization problem, such as ro-
bust UC problems [25, 30, 31], where all available resources
in the grid can be involved as the decision variables. How-
ever, in such a centralized formulation, an owner of renew-
able resources can be a “free rider,” who does not have re-
sponsibility for uncertainty management. In particular, the
uncertainty of renewable resources can be covered by dis-
patchable resources owned by some other aggregators. In
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Table 2
List of thermal generators.
Label: Type Capacity [MW] Cost [JPY/kWh] Duration [h]
G1: Coal (C) 3000 1.95 12
G2: Coal (A) 2500 4.23 12
G3: Coal (B) 2000 3.58 12
G4: LNG (A) 2250 5.48 1
G5: Coal (D) 1500 4.88 12
G6: Oil (A) 500 12.39 1
G7: Oil (B) 500 11.31 1
G8: LNG (B) 1000 5.40 1
G9: Coal (A) 2760 4.23 12
G10: LNGCC (C) 8312 1.91 6
G11: LNGCC (B) 4500 4.07 1
G12: LNGCC (A) 3700 2.48 1
G13: LNG (C) 2400 6.02 1
G14: LNGCC (A) 1265 2.48 1
G15: LNGCC (C) 1710 1.91 6
G16: Coal (D) 1160 4.88 12
G17: LNG (B) 820 5.40 1
G18: Oil (B) 831 11.31 1
G19: Oil (A) 957 12.39 1
G20: LNG (B) 1050 5.40 1
G21: LNG (A) 1000 5.48 1
G22: Oil (C) 900 11.48 1
G23: Oil (B) 675 11.31 1
G24: Oil (A) 751 12.39 1
G25: Coal (C) 4450 1.95 12
G26: Oil (B) 1000 11.31 1
G27: LNG (C) 1340 6.02 1
G28: LNGCC (B) 1560 4.07 1
G29: Coal (B) 3130 3.58 12
G30: Oil (C) 1250 11.48 1
general, it is not easy to determine a reasonable price or side
payment for the use of such resources of others, because a
unique price invariant for renewable scenarios is difficult to
determine. This actually hampers the spread of storage re-
sources, such as battery systems, to absorb uncertainty of
renewable energy. In contrast, our market model imposes
self-responsibility to uncertainty management on each ag-
gregator. This enables to create synergy between renewable
and storage resources; Each aggregator has an incentive to
own a storage resource in conjunction with a renewable re-
source because reducing a waste of energy curtailment due
to uncertainty makes his/her own profit higher.
4 Numerical Analysis
4.1 Simulation Setup
4.1.1 PV-Integrated IEEJ EAST 30-Machine Model
In this section, we conduct a numerical analysis to investi-
gate what level of battery penetration can be realized from
the viewpoints of not only social economy but also personal
economy, under the market regulation in which each aggre-
gator is responsible for absorbing the uncertainty of his/her
renewable power generation. We suppose a spatio-temporal
energy market in the north east area of Japan depicted as
in Fig. 2(a), which is divided into five subareas labeled as
Agg. 1–Agg. 5. A bulk power system model of this area is
found in the literature, called the IEEJ EAST 30-machine
model [38], whose network structure is shown in Fig. 2(b).
We modify it as integrating photovoltaic (PV) generators at
buses around residential areas. In this numerical simulation,
we suppose that each subarea is managed by a correspond-
ing aggregator who participates in the energy market. Fur-
thermore, we suppose that, prosumption energy amounts
are transacted at 24 time spots, and the transactions of
prosumption profiles are conducted at seven buses, denoted
as Buses 1–7 in Fig. 2(b). Therefore, each spatio-temporal
prosumption profile xα in (5) and the clearing price profile
λ in (7) are both (24× 7)-dimensional.
Each aggregator is supposed to have several types of gen-
erators, loads, batteries, and PV generators, as being com-
patible with the mathematical modeling in Section 3. In the
following, we describe the details of Aggregator 1 because
those of the other aggregators are similar. The supplemen-
tary material of this paper lists the complete information of
all aggregators, while explaining the practical meanings of
parameter settings, which are based on real data sets.
4.1.2 Setup of Generators
The fuel cost and output capacity of each generator are
listed in Table 2. In this table, “Duration” corresponds to
the period of output regulation. For example, the output of
Coal (C) is regulated every 12 hours, i.e., its output is fixed
during the day and night time.
As seen from Fig. 2(b), Aggregator 1 has three generators,
labeled as G1, G4, and G5. Let g
(1)
1 , g
(2)
1 , and g
(3)
1 denote
the power generation profiles of those generators. Then, the
generation cost function of Aggregator 1 is given as
G1(g1) = min
(g
(1)
1 ,g
(2)
1 ,g
(3)
1 )
3∑
k=1
c
(k)
1 1
Tg
(k)
1
s.t. g1 =
3∑
k=1
g
(k)
1 , (g
(1)
1 , g
(2)
1 , g
(3)
1 ) ∈ G(1)1 × G(2)1 × G(3)1
where the fuel cost and the output limit of the kth generator
are denoted by c
(k)
1 [JPY/kWh] and G(k)1 , respectively.
4.1.3 Setup of Loads
The load profile of each aggregator is given as a typical pro-
file of consumers such as residences, commercial facilities,
and factories. The aggregate of all aggregators’ load pro-
files, which amounts to 950.6[GWh], is plotted by the black
dotted line of the upper envelope of Fig. 4(a1), which is
identical to those in Figs. 4(a2)–(a4), and those in Figs. 5–
7(a1)–(a4). The load profile of Aggregator 1 is plotted by
the black line with circles in Fig. 8(a1), which is the same
as those in Figs. 8(a2) and (a3). This load profile corre-
sponds to the aggregate of 8.19 million residences in terms
of consumption energy amounts.
4.1.4 Setup of PV Generators
We consider three penetration levels of PV generators, re-
ferred to as PV(1), PV(2), and PV(3). This PV penetration
level is based on the premise of the feed-in tariff scheme in
Japan. In particular, according to the roadmap of Japan
Photovoltaic Energy Association [39], we set PV(1)–PV(3)
as being comparable to the estimations in 2020, 2030, and
9
Agg. 3
Agg. 2
Agg. 1
Agg. 4
Agg. 5
Line 1
Line 2
Line 3
Line 4
Line 5
Line 6
Line 7
Line 1
Line 2
Line 3
Line 5
Line 4
Line 6
Line 7
Agg. 1
Agg. 2
Agg. 3
Agg. 4
Agg. 5
(a) (b)
Bus 6
Bus 7
Bus 3
Bus 1
Bus 2
Bus 4Bus 5
Fig. 2. (a) North east area of Japan divided into five subareas. (b) PV-integrated IEEJ EAST 30-machine model. The subareas
labeled as Agg. α and the major transmission lines labeled as Line i are compatible in both subfigures.
2050, respectively. In this simulation, ten scenarios are con-
sidered for each aggregator, i.e., m = 10 in (10).
At the level of PV(1), the aggregate average of all PV sce-
narios subtracted from the aggregate of all load profiles, i.e.,
5∑
α=1
{
lα − 1
10
10∑
s=1
p(s)α
}
,
is plotted by the green dotted line in Fig. 4(a1), which is
identical to those in Figs. 4(a2)–(a4). In a similar way,
the corresponding profiles are plotted in Figs. 5(a1)–(a4)
and Figs. 6(a1)–(a4) at the levels of PV(2) and PV(3),
respectively. Furthermore, the PV scenarios of Aggregator 1
are plotted by the thin solid lines in Figs. 8(a1)–(a3), which
correspond to PV(1)–PV(3), respectively.
4.1.5 Setup of Batteries
The basic objective of this numerical analysis is to inves-
tigate how the penetration levels of batteries affect market
results. The battery penetration level is defined as follows.
The aggregate of all loads, i.e.,
∑5
α=1 lα, can be regarded as
95 million residential loads in terms of consumption energy.
Based on this, we say that the battery penetration level is
r% if each of r% of 95 million residences has a battery with
±7[kW] inverter capacity and 14[kWh] battery capacity. Its
charge and discharge efficiencies are supposed to be 0.95.
The battery cost functionDα is specifically given as follows.
Let σ0α denote the initial amount of stored energy, i.e., the
state of charge (SOC), which is defined as the deviation from
a neutral value. It is reasonable to suppose that a higher
level of the final SOC is more preferable than a lower level,
and vice versa. To take into account this aspect, we suppose
that each aggregator assesses the value of the final SOC by
Dα(δα) = −d
(
σfinα (δα)
)
(26)
Fig. 3. Graph of d. The slope of each segment is denoted as ai.
where σfinα denotes the final SOC defined by
σfinα (δα) := σ
0
α + 1
T(δinα − δoutα ),
and d : R→ R is a concave function given as
d(σ) :=

a4(σ − σ) + a3σ, σ ≤ σ,
a3σ, 0 ≤ σ < σ,
a2σ, σ ≤ σ < 0,
a1(σ − σ) + a2σ, σ < σ.
This concave function d, the graph of which is depicted
in Fig. 3, reflects a basic strategy of aggregators for bat-
tery management. For example, if the temporal average of
a clearing price is between a3 and a2, then each aggregator
aims at restoring the final SOC to 50%, or if it is between
a2 and a1, then each aggregator aims at regulating the final
SOC to σ as selling the battery stored energy.
In this simulation, we set a1 = 11, a2 = 8, a3 = 4, a4 = 1,
and σ0α = 0 for all α = 1, . . . , 5. The values of σ and σ are
set to represent 37.5% and 62.5% of the full SOC.
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Table 3
List of transmission line capacities.
Line label 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Capacity [GW] 0.63 0.38 1.16 0.49 0.81 0.88 1.05
4.1.6 Setup of Transmission Line Constraints
As spatial constraints, we take into account the capacities of
the major transmission lines denoted as Lines 1–7 in Fig. 2,
while regarding each subarea as an aggregated single bus
system, inside of which the capacities of transmission lines
are large enough. In this simulation, we set the capacities of
Lines 1–7 as listed in Table 3.
4.1.7 Setup of Prosumption Cost Functions
The prosumption cost function of each of all aggregators is
constructed based on the definition of F˜α in (20) for which
the uniform probability distribution, i.e.,
pi(s)α =
1
10
, ∀s ∈ {1, . . . , 10}
is supposed for every aggregator.
4.2 Simulation Results
4.2.1 Overviews of Prosumption Balancing
Solving the social cost minimization problem (3), we ob-
tain the transacted spatio-temporal prosumption profiles
x∗1, . . . , x
∗
5 and the clearing price λ
∗. For visualization of the
market results, we introduce the notation of(
g∗α(s),δ
∗
α(s), q
∗
α(s)
)
:= arg min
(gα,δα,qα)∈Fα(x∗α;p(s)α )
{
Gα(gα) +Dα(δα)
}
,
which represents the optimal adjustable variable when the
renewable scenario p
(s)
α arises. The components of x∗α and
δ∗α are denoted in such a way that
x∗α = (x
(1)∗
α , . . . , x
(7)∗
α ), δ
∗
α(s) =
(
δin∗α (s), δ
out∗
α (s)
)
.
At the levels of PV(1)–PV(3), we plot the overviews of pro-
sumption balancing in Figs. 4–6(a1)–(a4), the subfigures
of which correspond to 0%, 5%, 20%, and 40% battery pene-
tration levels, respectively. The black thick line in each sub-
figure represents the average of the total energy amounts
generated by the thermal generators, i.e.,
5∑
α=1
{
1
10
10∑
s=1
g∗α(s)
}
.
The gray shadowed area corresponds to the average of the
total PV curtailment amount, i.e.,
5∑
α=1
{
1
10
10∑
s=1
q∗α(s)
}
.
The blue lines in Figs. 4–6(a2)–(a4) represent the average
of the total battery charge and discharge profiles, i.e.,
5∑
α=1
{
1
10
10∑
s=1
(
δout∗1 (s)− δin∗1 (s)
)}
.
From these figures, we see that the total thermal power gen-
eration profile becomes flat as the battery penetration level
increases. Furthermore, from Fig. 4(a1) and Fig. 5(a1), we
see that the amounts of PV curtailment are considerably
small even without batteries. This is because the PV uncer-
tainty is relatively small as thermal generators can manage
it. On the other hand, the PV uncertainty in Fig. 6(a1) is
too large to manage. Then, Figs. 6(a2)–(a4) show that the
PV curtailment amount properly decreases as the battery
penetration level increases. These results imply that PV
power generation with an appropriate amount of batteries
has priority of energy supply higher than thermal genera-
tors while that without batteries does not always have such
priority due to its uncertainty. This result gives an answer
to Q2 in Section 2.3 with regard to merit order of different
energy resources.
For reference, at the level of PV(3), we show in Figs. 7(a1)–
(a4) the overviews of prosumption balancing when trans-
mission line constraints on Lines 1–7 are removed. In fact,
Figs. 7(a1)–(a4) are almost the same as Figs. 6(a1)–(a4),
meaning that the transmission line capacities in Table 3 are
large enough, at least, to obtain the optimal prosumption
balancing.
4.2.2 Spetio-Temporal Clearing Price Profiles
At the levels of PV(1)–PV(3), we plot in Figs. 4–6(b1)–
(b4) the resultant clearing price profiles, which are spatio-
temporally distributed. In each subfigure, the minimum and
maximum prices are written in white. First, from Figs. 4–
6(b1), we see that peak prices around evening appear due to
the use of expensive generators. Then, from Figs. 4–6(b2),
we see that those price peaks disappear as the battery pen-
etration level slightly increases. Furthermore, we can also
see from Figs. 4–6(b2)–(b4) that price differences gradu-
ally reduce as the battery penetration level increases, and
finally an increased battery penetration level results in price
leveling-off, i.e., the clearing price profile at each of all buses
has an almost flat distribution. This is the result of arbi-
trage, i.e., temporal energy shift, enabled by batteries.
For reference, at the level of PV(3), we show in Figs. 7(b1)–
(b4) the resultant clearing price profiles when transmission
line constraints are removed. In this case, the spatial distri-
butions of clearing price profiles become flat. This is because
Buses 1–7 can be equivalently aggregated into a single bus;
see Figs. 1(a) and (b) for the depiction of a multiple-bus
system and its aggregated single-bus alternative.
4.2.3 Resultant Profiles of Aggregator 1
At 5% battery penetration level, we plot the resultant pro-
files of Aggregator 1 in Fig. 8. In particular, Figs. 8(a1)–
(d1) correspond to PV(1), Figs. 8(a2)–(d2) correspond to
PV(2), and Figs. 8(a3)–(d3) correspond to PV(3). For clar-
ity, the legends of Fig. 8 are summarized in Table 4. From
these figures, we see that the uncertainty of PV scenarios
is absorbed by appropriate combination of generator man-
agement, battery management, and PV curtailment. In par-
ticular, we see from Figs. 8(b2)–(c2) that thermal gener-
ators mainly serves for compensating the difference in the
total energy amount of PV scenarios while batteries serves
for absorbing the fluctuation of each PV scenario. Only in
Fig. 8(a3), the PV curtailment is carried out as a last resort
because the PV uncertainty is too large to be managed by
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generators and batteries. Note that the final SOC in every
case is mostly restored to the neutral as a result of the final
SOC evaluation by Dα in (26).
4.2.4 Social Costs versus Battery Penetration Levels
Varying battery penetration levels, we plot the resultant so-
cial costs in Fig. 9(a1)–(a3), which correspond to PV(1)–
PV(3), respectively. From these figures, we see that the so-
cial cost decreases as the battery penetration level increases.
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This is a natural consequence because the realizable spatio-
temporal prosumption profile setXα in (14), the direct prod-
uct of which corresponds to the feasible domain of the social
cost minimization problem (3), enlarges as the battery pen-
etration level increases. We also see that the higher the PV
penetration level is, the more effective the battery enhance-
ment is. This is because the amount of waste PV curtailment
can be significantly reduced by energy storage systems.
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Fig. 8. Profiles of Aggregator 1 at 5% battery penetration level. (a1)–(d1) Penetration level of PV(1). (a2)–(d2) Penetration
level of PV(2). (a3)–(d3) Penetration level of PV(3). (a1)–(a3) Prosumption (sign opposite), load, PV scenarios, PV curtailments
subtracted from PV scenarios. (b1)–(b3) Thermal power generation. (c1)–(c3) Battery charge and discharge. (d1)–(d3) SOC.
Table 4
Legend of Fig. 8 (For representation of SOC, “M” is used to denote lower triangular matrix whose nonzero elements are all one).
Mathematical representation Meaning Subfigures Line marker
l1 Load (a1)–(a3) •
−(x(1)∗1 + · · · + x
(7)∗
1 ) Sum of prosumption profiles at all buses (with opposite signs) (a1)–(a3) 
g∗1 (s) (s = 1, . . . , 10) Generation profiles (10 scenarios) (b1)–(b3) ∗
p
(s)
1 (s = 1, . . . , 10) PV senarios (10 scenarios) (a1)–(a3) none
p
(s)
1 − q∗1 (s) (s = 1, . . . , 10) PV curtailment profiles subtracted from PV scenarios (10 scenarios) (a1)–(a3) ∗
δout∗1 (s)− δin∗1 (s) (s = 1, . . . , 10) Battery charge and discharge profiles (10 scenarios) (c1)–(c3) ∗
M(δin∗1 (s)− δout∗1 (s)) (s = 1, . . . , 10) SOC profiles (10 scenarios) (d1)–(d3) ∗
4.2.5 Personal Profits versus Battery Penetration Levels
From the viewpoint of personal profit, we discuss a so-
cial equilibrium of battery penetration levels, giving an
answer to Q3. We plot the profits of each aggregator,
i.e., Jα(x
∗
α;λ
∗), in Figs. 9(b1)–(b3), which correspond to
PV(1)–PV(3), respectively. From these figures, at the levels
of PV(2) and PV(3), we see that the increasing rate of the
personal profit is relatively high at lower battery penetra-
tion levels, while it decreases at higher battery penetration
levels. This profit saturation can be explained by the fact
that the increment in profits by battery arbitrage as well as
by PV curtailment reduction decrease as the battery pen-
etration level increases. This trend can be confirmed from
the Figs. 4–6(a1)–(a4) and Figs. 4–6(b1)–(b4), show-
ing that both PV curtailment amount and temporal price
volatility reduce as the battery penetration level increases.
Note that the enhancement of battery systems generally re-
quires an additional cost for battery purchase. To take into
account this fact, we calculate the actual net profit as in
Figs. 9(c1)–(c3). The battery price is supposed to be 5,000
[JPY/kWh] according to the price estimation in 2030 pub-
lished as the roadmap [40] from New Energy and Indus-
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purchase costs. Each diamond mark corresponds to the battery penetration level at which the maximum personal profit with respect
to battery system enhancement is attained.
trial Technology Development Organization (NEDO). From
these figures, we see that there is an equilibrium of the bat-
tery penetration level, highlighted by the diamond marks,
that attains the maximum of the net profit for each PV pen-
etration level. It should be emphasized that this equilibrium
can be realized as the assembly of long-term rational de-
cisions of competitive market players who pursue just per-
sonal profit maximization, not social profit maximization.
This spread of battery systems is a consequence of mecha-
nism design in this paper.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we presented modeling and analysis of day-
ahead spatio-temporal energy markets. We modeled the
spatio-temporal energy market as an adjustable robust con-
vex program, in which each competitive player is responsi-
ble for absorbing the uncertainty of renewable power gen-
eration. Furthermore, by numerical analysis with a PV-
integrated IEEJ EAST 30-machine model, we discussed the
merit order of different energy resources and the existence of
a social equilibrium of battery penetration levels, at which
the maximum personal profit with respect to battery system
enhancement is attained. Consideration of non-convexity in
unit commitment problems would be an interesting direc-
tion of future research.
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